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FEAR OF COMMITMENT:
WHY CA, INC. V. AFSCME LEAVES MANDATORY
ADVANCEMENT BYLAWS UNDISTURBED
Zachary N. Lupu*
Fiduciary duties bind a board of directors to manage a corporation in
the best interests of its shareholders at all times. The prominence of
fiduciary duties under Delaware corporate law has led Delaware courts to
invalidate corporate contracts that would prevent directors from exercising
their fiduciary duties. The Delaware Supreme Court extended this doctrine
to bylaws in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan by invalidating
a proposed bylaw that would mandate board action in violation of the
board’s fiduciary duties.
At the same time, the CA, Inc. decision called into question the continued
validity of mandatory advancement bylaws. It is well established in
Delaware corporate law that corporations may advance the legal expenses
of directors defending lawsuits related to their service on a corporate
board. Moreover, Delaware courts have broadly upheld directors’
advancement rights where a corporation has adopted a bylaw mandating
advancement to the full extent of Delaware law.
This Note examines the contours of fiduciary duty and advancement
jurisprudence in Delaware corporate law. Next, it discusses the perceived
impact the CA, Inc. decision has had on the enforceability of mandatory
advancement bylaws. It then proposes that the Delaware General Assembly
and stakeholders in Delaware corporations should independently take
action to protect advancement rights following CA, Inc. Finally, this Note
concludes that the CA, Inc. decision will not disturb mandatory
advancement bylaws in light of the particular standard of review employed
by the CA, Inc. court and cases relating to advancement bylaws.
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INTRODUCTION
Marc Hermelin joined the board of directors and became CEO of K-V
Pharmaceutical Company (KV) in 1975.1 After two pharmacies reported in
2008 that KV had manufactured and distributed oversized morphine tablets,
KV’s Audit Committee conducted an internal investigation that culminated
in Hermelin’s termination.2
Following Hermelin’s departure, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the
Eastern District of Missouri conducted its own investigation of KV’s error.3
As a result, Hermelin ultimately pled guilty to two federal strict liability
misdemeanors, resulting in $1.9 million in fines and forfeitures, and a jail
term of “30 days or less,” of which Hermelin served fifteen days. 4
During Hermelin’s time in the St. Louis County Jail, authorities there
recorded Hermelin’s conversations with visitors pursuant to the jail’s
policy. 5 A reporter with The St. Louis Post-Dispatch requested access to
these recordings and to jail records concerning Hermelin’s incarceration to
continue the Post-Dispatch’s coverage of the imbroglio at KV. 6 When
Hermelin initiated a lawsuit to prevent release of the recordings, the Circuit
Court of St. Louis County permanently enjoined the release on the ground
that the conversations were of a private nature. 7
Around the time that Hermelin brought suit, his counsel submitted
invoices to KV for fees relating to the jail records matter with the
expectation that the board would advance Hermelin’s legal expenses as
provided under an Indemnification Agreement that was executed in 2008

1. Hermelin v. K-V Pharm. Co., No. 6936, 2012 WL 395826, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7,
2012). KV is a Delaware corporation based in St. Louis, Missouri that markets generic and
branded pharmaceutical products. See About Us, KV PHARMACEUTICAL,
http://www.kvpharmaceutical.com/about_us_landing.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
Hermelin’s father, Victor Hermelin, founded KV in 1942, and the Hermelin family retains
control over the firm. See Jim Doyle, Federal Target Quits KV Board, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1.
2. Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826, at *2. This internal investigation discovered that KV
had also manufactured additional oversized tablets, including propafenone, an antiarrhythmic drug, and dextroamphetamine sulfate, a stimulant. Id. These drugs could pose
safety risks if taken in oversized form. Verified Amended Complaint ¶ 21, Hermelin, 2012
WL 395826 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 2011) (No. 6936), 2011 WL 5128206; Answer of Defendant
K-V Pharmaceutical Company ¶ 21, Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2011)
(No. 6936), 2011 WL 5617844. KV notified the FDA of its discovery of the oversized
morphine sulfate tablets, but it did not report its discovery of the other oversized pills.
Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826, at *2.
3. Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826, at *3.
4. Id.
5. Id. at *5.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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pursuant to KV’s bylaws. 8 When KV denied this request, Hermelin filed a
claim against KV seeking the advancement payments. 9
While the agreement at issue did not provide advancement for legal
action initiated by Hermelin, 10 Hermelin argued that he was, in fact, entitled
to advancement because he had not initiated the matter but instead
“employed the only defense available to him” under the circumstances.11
Moreover, Hermelin asserted that his lawsuit represented a compulsory
counterclaim not excepted under the agreement.12 KV argued that
Hermelin’s action for an injunction fell squarely within the exceptions to
Hermelin’s advancement rights under the agreement.13 KV also contended
that Hermelin’s suit did not qualify as a compulsory counterclaim as
defined by federal or state law. 14
Finding KV’s interpretation persuasive, the Delaware Court of Chancery
ultimately held that Hermelin was not entitled to advancement because the
relevant agreement did not afford Hermelin advancement for any “part” of a
legal proceeding he initiated.15 Furthermore, even if the agreement
mandated advancement for compulsory counterclaims, Hermelin’s action
for an injunction fell short of the Court of Chancery Rules’ definition of a
compulsory counterclaim. 16
Had Hermelin’s agreement indeed mandated advancement in this case,
KV’s counsel might have found it advantageous to pursue the newly viable
argument that compliance with the agreement’s advancement provision
would cause the board to violate its fiduciary duties. 17 Fiduciary duties
require that directors act in the best interests of their shareholders.18 Here,
the board could plausibly argue that it would be gross mismanagement of
KV shareholders’ wealth to hand over $375,000 19 to a former CEO who
had pled guilty to federal crimes and then sued the jail in which he was
incarcerated.
This argument became available in this context following the Delaware
Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension

8. Id. at *6–7; see also Defendant’s Opening Brief Opposing Advancement for the Jail
Records Litigation at 6, Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826 (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2011) (No. 6936),
2011 WL 6934085.
9. Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826, at *5 (“Hermelin seeks advancement for his legal fees
and expenses in prosecuting an action for injunctive relief against the St. Louis County Jail,
where Hermelin was incarcerated following his conviction in the Criminal Matter.”).
10. Id. at *7
11. Id. at *5.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *7.
16. Id. at *8 (citing DEL. CT. CH. R. 13(a)).
17. See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
18. See infra Part I.A.1.
19. Opening Pre-Hearing Brief of Plaintiff Marc S. Hermelin in Support of His Claim
for Advancement in the “Jail Records Matter” and in Support of His Claim for Fees-for-Fees
as to Count I at 2, Hermelin, 2012 WL 395826 (Del. Ch. Dec. 27, 2011) (No. 6936), 2011
WL 6934086.
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Plan. 20 There, the court considered the validity of a proposed bylaw that
would require a board to reimburse expenses reasonably incurred by
shareholders in a successful electoral challenge to incumbent directors.21 In
its decision, the court relied on precedent holding that directors’ fiduciary
duties always supersede contractual obligations,22 rendering unenforceable
agreements that interfere with the exercise of fiduciary duties. 23 Along
these lines, the court held the proposed bylaw in CA, Inc. invalid because
bylaws mandating board action in breach of fiduciary duties are invalid as
well, unless they contain a “fiduciary out” provision expressly permitting
the board to exercise its duties.24
Thus, CA, Inc. dictates that a mandatory advancement bylaw lacking a
fiduciary out is also invalid, as it would require a board to breach its
fiduciary duties by expending corporate funds to defend a disreputable
director. 25 Inclusion of a fiduciary out would cure this defect, but it would
also permit a board to avoid a clear obligation to advance, thereby gutting
the mandatory nature of mandatory advancement bylaws. 26
This Note explores the impact of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision
in CA, Inc. on mandatory advancement bylaws. Part I first examines how
directors’ fiduciary duties came to supersede corporate contracts and
explains the CA, Inc. court’s extension of this doctrine to the bylaw context.
It then introduces Delaware’s indemnification and advancement regime and
describes the scope of mandatory advancement bylaws. Part II explores
how the CA, Inc. holding conflicts with well-established law that mandatory
advancement bylaws lacking fiduciary outs are indeed enforceable. Finally,
Part III offers two approaches to protect mandatory advancement should
CA, Inc. render existing mandatory advancement bylaws invalid. The Note
concludes, however, that CA, Inc. does not, in fact, invalidate current
mandatory advancement bylaws due to the standard of review employed in
CA, Inc., and given Delaware precedent enforcing advancement bylaws
broadly.
I. BURDENS AND BENEFITS: FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND ADVANCEMENT
RIGHTS
Part I begins by reviewing corporate directors’ fiduciary duties under
Delaware law. 27 Next, it examines Delaware case law invalidating

20. 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008); infra note 302 and accompanying text (noting a Delaware
Vice Chancellor’s opinion that an argument such as Hermelin’s may be asserted in good
faith following CA, Inc.); see also infra Part I.5.
21. See infra Part I.A.5.
22. See infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Part I.A.4.
24. See infra notes 151–52 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 288–91 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
27. This Note examines Delaware law because Delaware is the state of incorporation of
the vast majority of America’s most significant corporations and because its corporate law is
followed by many other states. See DEL. DIVISION CORPS., http://corp.delaware.gov (last
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corporate contracts that would preclude directors from exercising their
fiduciary duties and the extension of this principle in CA, Inc. to mandatory
bylaws. It then explains the regime for directorial indemnification and
advancement under the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Part I
concludes by describing the contours of a director’s advancement
entitlement pursuant to a mandatory advancement bylaw.
A. The Primacy of Fiduciary Duties
This section briefly discusses the function and substance of directors’
traditional and enhanced fiduciary duties. It then traces a line of decisions
in which the Delaware Supreme Court struck down agreements that would
require directors to breach their fiduciary duties. Next, it explains the origin
of the requirement that merger agreements contain “fiduciary out”
provisions to preserve directors’ ability to exercise their duties. It
concludes by describing the CA, Inc. court’s decision to invalidate a
mandatory bylaw because it would interfere with the discharge of fiduciary
duties.
1. The Rationale for Fiduciary Duties
A defining feature of public corporations in the United States is that their
ownership and management are independent of each other. 28 This
separation of ownership and control, which Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means famously documented in 1932,29 results from typically dispersed
networks of shareholders who lack the resources necessary to manage
corporations collectively. 30 As a result, shareholders entrust control of a
corporation to a board of directors, which commands a broad power to
manage the corporation’s “business and affairs.” 31
Despite their expansive power, directors occasionally face situations
where they are unsure what course of action is in the best interests of the
corporation. 32 Moreover, the interests of shareholders and directors are

visited Feb. 23, 2012) (noting that more than 50 percent of all U.S. publicly traded
companies and 63 percent of the Fortune 500 are incorporated in Delaware).
28. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 4 (1932) (describing a modern corporation as one “in which a large
measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the multiplication of
owners”). See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J. L. & ECON. 301 (1983).
29. See generally Berle & MEANS, supra note 28.
30. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case
of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 29 (2003) (“[C]onsider the difficulties
shareholders would face in acting as the public corporation's central decision-makers. At the
most basic level, the mechanical difficulties of achieving consensus amongst thousands of
decision-makers impede shareholders from taking an active role.”).
31. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (providing that “every [Delaware]
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”).
32. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699, 2005 WL 3529317, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 20, 2005) (illustrating this problem using an example from agency law).
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often different. 33 Indeed, given their power, directors may be tempted to
act opportunistically, exploiting shareholder wealth for their own gain.34
This unfortunate prospect gives rise to “agency costs”:
expenses
shareholders bear to ensure the board acts in shareholders’ best interests. 35
As agency costs represent a chief concern of corporate law, identifying
strategies to mitigate self-serving directorial conduct has become a central
question of legal scholarship. 36 A principal mechanism to address agency
costs is the imposition of “fiduciary duties” on directors to guide board
decision making when the optimal course of action is unclear. 37 Fiduciary
duties exist to ensure that directors eschew self-interest and act in the best
interests of shareholders. 38 As a result, Delaware corporate law heavily
relies on fiduciary duties to reduce agency costs in public corporations.39
2. The Traditional Duties of Care and Loyalty
Directors’ fiduciary duties have traditionally fallen into two broad
categories: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 40 A director is always
33. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 28, at 6 (noting that the separation of ownership
and control “produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager
may, and often do, diverge”); see also Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency
Costs, and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1433 (1985) (noting the
potential for “self-dealing or possible self-aggrandizing behavior” by agents, including
corporate directors).
34. See, e.g., Edward S. Adams, Bridging the Gap Between Ownership and Control, 34
J. CORP. L. 409, 411–12 (2009) (noting that “an incentive exists [for directors] to
exploit . . . shareholder wealth in the form of higher management salaries, bonuses, and
perquisites” and that “the risk of [board] exploitation of shareholder wealth and investment
is great”).
35. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (defining
agency costs generally as the sum of “the monitoring expenditures by the principal[,] the
bonding expenditures by the agent[, and] the residual loss”); cf. Bainbridge, supra note 30, at
6 (“Agency costs arise because agents have incentives to shirk, which we might define as
any action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the team as a
whole.”).
36. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 28; Brudney, supra note 33; Fama & Jensen,
supra note 28; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 35.
37. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699, 2005 WL 3529317, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 20, 2005) (“Fiduciary duties exist in order to fill the gaps in the contractual relationship
between the shareholders and directors of the corporation.”); see also FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 92–93
(1991) (noting that “the fiduciary principle is a rule for completing incomplete bargains in a
contractual structure”).
38. See Christopher Fawal, Note, Protecting Shareholder Access to Director Elections:
A Response to CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Urging the Adoption of a Blasius Standard of Review
for the Exercise of a Fiduciary-Out Clause, 59 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1482 (2010) (describing the
“logic” of fiduciary duties).
39. See Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783,
783 (2011).
40. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)
(holding, despite precedent characterizing directors’ fiduciary duty as a “triad” comprising
good faith, due care, and loyalty, that there are only two fiduciary duties: the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty); see also infra note 48 (describing the duty of good faith as a duty
attendant to the duty of loyalty).
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expected to act in accordance with these basic duties. 41 The duty of care
requires a director to use an “amount of care which ordinarily careful and
prudent men would use in similar circumstances.” 42 The Delaware
Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean that a director must consider all
material information reasonably available before he makes a business
decision. 43
In cases alleging breach of the duty of care, courts employ the business
judgment rule, which presumes that a director making a business decision
“‘acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.’” 44 Indeed, a court
will presume a director has exercised sound business judgment as long as
the challenged business decision can be attributed to a rational purpose.45
Therefore, only conduct amounting to gross negligence comprises a breach
of the duty of care. 46
The duty of loyalty requires a director to refrain from conduct that would
deny a benefit to the corporation and its stockholders. 47 Essentially, the
duty of loyalty prevents a director from subordinating corporate interests to
his own through transactions that exploit the corporation. 48
In cases alleging breach of the duty of loyalty, courts employ the entire
fairness standard, which first burdens the plaintiff to establish a director’s
personal interest in the challenged transaction.49 The burden then shifts to
the interested director to demonstrate that the terms of the transaction are
41. Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 575 (2004) (“[A] director’s good faith
adherence to the duties of care and loyalty are expected to guide her conduct at all times.”).
42. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d,
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
43. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[D]irectors have a duty to
inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information
reasonably available to them. Having become so informed, they must then act with requisite
care in the discharge of their duties.”).
44. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d
at 812).
45. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A court under
such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business
judgment.”).
46. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826 (N.J. 1981) (noting that
a director’s failure to read and understand financial statements and to make reasonable
attempts at detection and prevention of illegal conduct by management constituted a breach
of her duty of care).
47. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987)
(“In short, directors must eschew any conflict between duty and self-interest.”).
48. See RODMAN WARD, JR., EDWARD P. WELCH, & ANDREW J. TUREZYN, FOLK ON THE
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.1.1 (4th ed. Supp. I 2006) (noting that the
duty of loyalty “proscribes a [director] from any means of misappropriation of assets
entrusted to his management and supervision”). The duty of loyalty encompasses the
attendant duty of good faith, which prohibits a “conscious disregard for [directorial]
responsibilities.” Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.
2006).
49. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (“[I]t is first the burden
of the plaintiff attacking the [transaction] to demonstrate some basis for invoking the fairness
obligation.”).
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intrinsically fair to the corporation.50 This doctrine’s rationale is that a
director should be an independent corporate decision maker. 51 Thus, when
a director’s conduct falls short of this goal, a court will stand in as an
objective arbiter both to confirm that the transaction is fair to the
corporation and to hold the interested director liable when it is not. 52
3. Enhanced Duties in Change of Control and Defensive Circumstances
Given that courts defer to a board’s business judgment unless a director
has effectively swindled the corporation, most corporate transactions are not
subject to rigorous judicial review. 53 Courts will only scrutinize a board’s
decision to engage in either (1) a transaction that represents a sale of
corporate control, or (2) a short-term defensive tactic.54
A sale of control triggers directors’ Revlon duties, which require directors
to maximize short-term value to shareholders. 55 Either a sale of all shares
for cash 56 or a stock-for-stock merger that results in a combined company
with a majority shareholder 57 comprises a sale of control. 58 Thus, when
such transactions are challenged, courts hold directors’ conduct to a
standard of “immediate shareholder wealth maximization.” 59

50. See id. at 710 (“The requirement of fairness is unflinching in its demand that where
one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establishing its entire fairness,
sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courts.”). The two basic aspects of
fairness are fair dealing and fair price. Id. at 711.
51. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
52. See id. Nevertheless, section 144 of the DGCL furnishes two methods by which a
director may cleanse the taint of an unfair, self-interested transaction: when a director fully
discloses her interest and a majority of either (1) the disinterested directors, or (2) the
disinterested shareholders approves the transaction, it is not voidable solely due to the
director’s interest. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001 & Supp. 2010).
53. See Griffith, supra note 41, at 576 (“The business judgment rule shields directors
from judicial second-guessing for all but the most careless acts, and courts will only consider
the substantive fairness of a deal when the loyalty of directors is compromised by a conflict
of interest.”).
54. See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1912 (2003) (synthesizing rules derived from “classic takeover
cases”).
55. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(Once directors decide to negotiate the sale of a corporation, “the directors’ role change[s]
from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for
the stockholders at a sale of the company”).
56. See, e.g., id. at 178–79.
57. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del.
1993) (explaining that the shareholders in that case “will have no leverage in the future to
demand another control premium” such that the sale represents their last opportunity to
monetize their investment fully).
58. Notably, there is no sale of control in (1) a stock-for-stock merger resulting in a
diffusely held combined company, see, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos.
10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 WL 79880, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff’d on other
grounds, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), or (2) a merger realizing a board’s long-term strategy,
see, e.g., Time, 571 A.2d 1140.
59. Griffith, supra note 41, at 576.
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Courts also apply enhanced review when a board adopts a short-term
device to defend against a hostile takeover bid. 60 In such circumstances,
courts scrutinize the board’s decision under the Unocal standard in an effort
to protect shareholders from the “omnipresent specter” of board selfentrenchment. 61 Unocal scrutiny requires that directors establish (1) that
the board reasonably perceived a threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness, 62 and (2) that the defensive measure adopted is proportional
and reasonable in relation to the threat posed.63 Once a board has satisfied
this standard, its decision receives the protection of the business judgment
rule. 64
4. Anti-precommitment Doctrine and the “Fiduciary Out” Requirement
in Corporate Contracts
In corporate transactions, boards often find it useful to commit in
advance, or “precommit,” to a particular deal or course of action to
guarantee certain outcomes and to control perceived risks.65
60. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985); see
also Justin W. Oravetz, Comment, Is a Merger Agreement Ever Certain? The Impact of the
Omnicare Decision on Deal Protection Devices, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 805, 809 (2004)
(“Delaware courts apply the Unocal heightened standard of review when a board of directors
adopt[s] defensive protection devices in response to a hostile takeover.”). Notably, Unocal
analysis is not applied when the defensive measure in question is actually a merger realizing
the board’s pre-existing strategy. See Griffith, supra note 54, at 1909 n.39 (“[A]s long as the
target board is not under Revlon and can argue that its [merger] plan pre-dates the
appearance of the [hostile takeover] bid, Unocal will not force it to deal with unsolicited
bidders.”).
61. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954–55. This enhanced duty and attendant judicial review exist
because a board defending a takeover bid “may be acting primarily in its own interests,
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.” Id. Unocal was decided prior to
Revlon.
62. Id. at 955. A board can satisfy this burden by showing it took action in good faith
based upon reasonable investigation. Id.
63. Id. In identifying a proportional response, a board must analyze the nature of the
takeover threat and its effect on the corporation as a whole, including the following factors:
“[the] inadequacy of the price offered, [the] nature and timing of the offer, questions of
illegality, the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and
the quality of securities being offered in the exchange.” Id. “Coercive” or “preclusive”
measures are per se unreasonable, as the board “‘does not have unbridled discretion to defeat
any perceived threat by any Draconian means available.’” Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp.,
651 A.2d 1361, 1387–88 (Del. 1995) (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955). A response is
coercive when it is “aimed at forcing upon stockholders a management-sponsored alternative
to a hostile offer,” and a response is preclusive if it “deprives stockholders of the right to
receive [any bid] or precludes a bidder from seeking control by fundamentally restricting
proxy contests or otherwise.” Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 935
(Del. 2003) (citing Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387; Time, 571 A.2d at 1154). Courts will defer,
however, to a board that has adopted a defensive measure that falls within a “range of
reasonableness.” Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1388.
64. See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387–88.
65. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case
of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 20 (2003) (“[P]recommitment strategies
are useful . . . because they protect against passion and time inconsistency.”). Planned
transactions often fall apart for any number of reasons, including one party’s poor business
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Precommitment strategies also protect against the possibility that a board
could lose its resolve to execute a farsighted plan as circumstances
change. 66
Nevertheless, common law dictates that a contract is invalid and
unenforceable if it compels a board to breach its fiduciary duties.67
Delaware judicial decisions have incorporated this doctrine into the state’s
jurisprudence as well. 68 As a result, in a string of significant cases, the
Delaware Supreme Court nullified corporate contracts that would
precommit boards to a course of action—whether commitment to or
avoidance of a particular deal—when fiduciary duties would demand action
(or inaction) otherwise. 69 Thus, the court curbed use of precommitment
strategies, adopting instead the rule that boards have an “ongoing duty to
constantly reevaluate” decisions in light of fiduciary duties.70
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,71 a target
corporation’s board adopted measures to protect a deal with a preferred
acquirer, including a no-shop provision, a termination fee, and a grant of
stock options to the acquirer. 72 Consistent with these obligations, the board
refused to negotiate with an intervening bidder that offered a higher bid for
the target’s shares. 73 When the bidder brought suit, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that the contract’s provisions were invalid and unenforceable to
the extent they limited fiduciary duties or prevented the board from
exercising its Revlon duty to maximize value in a sale of control.74 Thus,
the court held that provisions that would precommit the target board to a

performance, fluctuations in stock price that devalue the assets to be exchanged, fluctuations
in interest rates that render financing untenable, and intervening bids that call into question
the deal’s desirability. See Griffith, supra note 54, at 1900.
66. Griffith, supra note 41, at 597 (noting that an individual undertaking a
precommitment strategy “acknowledges that in the future, her preferences will change and
she will lack the will to carry out her current plans”).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 (1981) (“A promise by a fiduciary
[director] to violate his fiduciary duty or a promise that tends to induce such a violation is
unenforceable on grounds of public policy.”); see also id. cmt. a (“Directors . . . of a
corporation act in a fiduciary capacity and are subject to the rule stated in this Section.”).
68. See, e.g., McAllister v. Kallop, No. 12856, 1995 WL 462210, at *21 (Del. Ch. July
28, 1995) (“To the extent that a contract, or a portion of a contract, limits a director’s
exercise of his fiduciary duties, it is unenforceable.”).
69. See UniSuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No. 1699, 2005 WL 3529317, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 20, 2005) (“Generally speaking, these cases stand for the proposition that a contract is
unenforceable if it would require the board to refrain from acting when the board’s fiduciary
duties require action.”).
70. Bainbridge, supra note 65, at 20.
71. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
72. Id. at 39. The no-shop provision provided that the target board would “not solicit,
encourage, discuss, negotiate, or endorse any competing transaction” unless certain
circumstances were present. Id.
73. Id. at 48 (“The Paramount defendants contend that they were precluded by certain
contractual provisions, including the No-Shop Provision, from negotiating with QVC or
seeking alternatives.”).
74. See id.; see also supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon
duties).
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specific deal despite a superior bid impermissibly infringed on the board’s
exercise of its fiduciary duties.75
In Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro, 76 a target board amended
the corporation’s shareholder rights plan, or “poison pill,”77 so that a newly
elected board could not redeem the pill for six months after taking office. 78
This delayed redemption provision—known as a “no hand” pill—
represented a measure to protect against a takeover bid calling for Unocal
analysis. 79 When the bidder brought suit, the Delaware Supreme Court
held the provision invalid and unenforceable because it would prevent a
future board from redeeming the pill “even under circumstances where the
[future] board would be required to do so because of its fiduciary duty to
[its] stockholders.” 80 By precommitting its successor to pass over a
potentially desirable takeover bid, the current board would constrain its
successor from exercising its fiduciary duties, rendering the no hand pill
void.
The QVC and Quickturn decisions clearly demonstrate the Delaware
Supreme Court’s “dim view” of precommitments restricting exercise of
fiduciary duties. 81 Nevertheless, it was not until the Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
Healthcare, Inc. 82 decision that the court finally introduced a judicial
solution to impose flexibility on agreements promising precommitment: a
“fiduciary out” 83 requirement. 84
The corporations in Omnicare assembled two mechanisms to protect the
merger from competing bids. 85 First, the board of one of the corporations,
NCS Healthcare, would submit the deal to its stockholders even if the board
ultimately decided that the merger was not in the corporation’s best

75. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 50 (noting that the target board “squandered” its opportunity
“to negotiate on the stockholders’ behalf” and to discharge its “obligation to seek the best
value reasonably available”).
76. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
77. A “poison pill” is defined as “[a] corporation’s defense against an unwanted
takeover bid whereby shareholders are granted the right to acquire equity or debt securities at
a favorable price to increase the bidder’s acquisition costs.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1275
(9th ed. 2009).
78. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1287.
79. Id. at 1289–90.
80. Id. at 1292–93.
81. Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 107 (Del. Ch. 1999).
82. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
83. See William T. Allen, Understanding Fiduciary Outs: The What and the Why of an
Anomalous Concept, 55 BUS. LAW. 653, 653 (2000) (“Fiduciary outs are anomalous contract
provisions that generally provide an escape hatch to a target corporation from performing
some contractual undertaking meant to advance the closing of an acquisition agreement.”);
see also infra notes 94–95 and accompanying text.
84. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 942 (Veasey, C.J., dissenting) (describing the majority’s
decision as holding that “[a] merger agreement entered into after a market search, before any
prospect of a topping bid has emerged, which locks up stockholder approval and does not
contain a ‘fiduciary out’ provision, is per se invalid when a later significant topping bid
emerges”).
85. See id. at 918.
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interests. 86 Second, two NCS directors—who together owned a majority of
the company’s voting power—agreed to vote in favor of the merger. 87 A
bare majority of the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated these protective
measures under the Unocal standard. 88 Even though the NCS board
reasonably perceived a danger to the corporation,89 the court held that the
measures adopted were unreasonable because they made it virtually
impossible for a competing proposal to succeed.90
Alternatively, the court held that the merger agreement was invalid and
unenforceable because it resulted in the board disabling its own ability to
exercise its fiduciary duties.91 The court observed that contractual
obligations “must yield to the supervening responsibility” of directors to
exercise their “unremitting” fiduciary duties on a continuing basis.92
Accordingly, the court held that the NCS board was required to negotiate a
fiduciary out clause so that it could exercise its fiduciary duties in case of a
superior offer, thereby imposing a new requirement on merging
corporations. 93
Fiduciary out provisions allow a corporation “to renege on the
performance of contractual obligations when the board determines that such
performance” would violate the board’s fiduciary duties.94 Accordingly,

86. Id. at 925. The parties included this provision as permitted under section 251(c) of
the DGCL as amended in 1998. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2001) (“The terms of
the agreement may require that the agreement be submitted to the stockholders whether or
not the board of directors determines at any time subsequent to declaring its advisability that
the agreement is no longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders reject it.”). In
2003, the Delaware General Assembly removed this rule from section 251(c) and moved it
to new section 146 to expand its application from mergers and consolidations to any matter
submitted to stockholders. See An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to
the General Corporation Law, § 11, 74 Del. Laws 214 (2003); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 251(c) (Supp. 2010).
87. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 926.
88. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
89. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935 (noting “the possibility of losing the . . . offer and being
left with no comparable alternative transaction”).
90. See Orman v. Cullman, No. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20,
2004) (The devices “accomplished a fait accompli, i.e., they ‘made it ‘mathematically
impossible’ and ‘realistically unattainable’ for . . . any other proposal to succeed, no matter
how superior the proposal’” (quoting Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936)).
91. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 937.
92. Id. at 938–39.
93. See id. at 939.
94. Fawal, supra note 38, at 1480. The following no-talk example contains a “fiduciary
out”:
The Target shall not . . . participate in any negotiations or discussions regarding
any Alternative Transaction; provided, however, that if, at any time prior to the
adoption of this Agreement by the stockholders of the Target, the Board of
Directors of the Target determines in good faith, based on advice from outside
counsel, that the failure to provide such information or participate in such
negotiations or discussions would result in the breach of the fiduciary duties of the
Board of Directors of the Target to the Target’s stockholders under applicable law,
then the Target may . . . furnish information with respect to the Target and its
subsidiaries . . . pursuant to a customary confidentiality agreement containing
terms no less restrictive than the terms of the confidentiality agreement entered
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such provisions are simply a way to reconcile a board’s decisions with its
underlying duties to shareholders.95 In this way, Omnicare’s holding that a
corporation can only enter into an exclusive merger agreement if it also
negotiates a fiduciary out clause allowing the board to “terminate the deal if
a better one emerges” represents the pinnacle of Delaware’s antiprecommitment jurisprudence. 96
5. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan:
Extending Commitmentphobia to Bylaws
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Employees Pension Plan extends its anti-precommitment jurisprudence to
the corporate bylaw context. This section describes the court’s decision in
CA, Inc. and the limited impact of this decision on subsequent law.
a. The Occasion for the Decision
On March 13, 2008, AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 97 a stockholder
of CA, Inc., 98 submitted a proposed amendment to CA’s bylaws 99 for
inclusion in proxy materials for CA’s 2008 annual meeting. 100 The

into between the Target and the Acquiror . . . and . . . participate in discussions
regarding such proposal.
Griffith, supra note 54, at 1901 n.9 (quoting Panel on Negotiating Acquisitions of Public
Companies, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 219, 286 (2002) (Appendix F)).
95. Fawal, supra note 38, at 1480 (citing Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 938–39).
96. Sabrina Ursaner, Note, Keeping “Fiduciary Outs” out of Shareholder-Proposed
Bylaws: An Analysis of CA, Inc. v. AFSCME, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 479, 500 (2010).
Notably, the Omnicare decision produced vigorous dissents by Chief Justice Veasey and
Justice Steele. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 939 (3–2 decision) (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); id.
at 948 (Steele, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority adopted “proscriptive rules that
invalidate or render unenforceable precommitment strategies negotiated between two parties
to a contract who will presumably, in the absence of conflicted interest, bargain intensely
over every meaningful provision of a contract after careful cost benefit analysis”). The
Omnicare decision also gave rise to a wealth of scholarly commentary and criticism on the
decision’s impact on the validity of exclusive merger agreements. See generally Bainbridge,
supra note 65; Griffith, supra note 41; Griffith, supra note 54; Oravetz, supra note 60.
97. The AFSCME Employees Pension Plan is associated with the American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees Union. See About AFSCME, AFSCME,
http://www.afscme.org/union/about (last visited Feb. 23, 2012).
98. Formerly known as CA, Inc. and Computer Associates, CA Technologies is one of
the world’s largest providers of information technology management software. See About
Us, CA TECHS., http://www.ca.com/ca/en/about-us.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). CA is a
Delaware corporation with a twelve-member, non-classified board of directors. See CA, Inc.
v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 229 (Del. 2008).
99. Under the federal rules that govern proxy voting, a company must include bylaws
proposed by shareholders in its proxy materials when certain conditions are met. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011) (addressing “when a company must include a shareholder’s
[bylaw] proposal in its proxy statement”).
100. Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, Chairman, AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, to
Kenneth V. Handal, Exec. V.P., Global Risk & Compliance, & Corp. Sec’y, CA, Inc., 1
(Mar. 13, 2008) [hereinafter McEntee Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/
2008/ca14a8cert_att-a.pdf. This letter appears as Annex A to CA’s No-Action Request. See
Letter from David B. Harms, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, to Office of Chief Counsel, Div. of
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proposed bylaw would have required CA to reimburse the reasonable
expenses incurred by shareholders whose candidates were successfully
elected to CA’s board of directors. 101 According to the proposal’s
supporting statement, AFSCME proposed the reimbursement bylaw
because the shareholders’ power to elect the CA board is “the most
important mechanism” to ensure that the board manages CA in its
shareholders’ interests, and because reimbursement encourages electoral
challenges to the incumbent board. 102
As a result of AFSCME’s proposal, CA’s counsel sent a letter to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Corporation Finance
seeking a no-action letter confirming that the SEC would not recommend
enforcement action against CA if CA excluded the proposal from its proxy
materials for non-conformity with the proxy rules. 103 CA sought to exclude
AFSCME’s bylaw proposal on four grounds pursuant to the proxy rules:
(1) that the proposal related to a director nomination or election; 104 (2) that
the proposal was not a proper subject for shareholder action; 105 (3) that the

Corp. Fin., SEC at enclosure (Apr. 18, 2008) [hereinafter CA No-Action Request], available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert_att-a.pdf.
101. The text of AFSCME’s proposed bylaw was:
RESOLVED, that pursuant to section 109 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law and Article IX of the bylaws of CA, Inc., stockholders of CA hereby amend
the bylaws to add the following Section 14 to Article II:
The board of directors shall cause the corporation to reimburse a stockholder or
group of stockholders (together, the “Nominator”) for reasonable expenses
(“Expenses”) incurred in connection with nominating one or more candidates in a
contested election of directors to the corporation’s board of directors, including,
without limitation, printing, mailing, legal, solicitation, travel, advertising and
public relations expenses, so long as (a) the election of fewer than 50% of the
directors to be elected is contested in the election, (b) one or more candidates
nominated by the Nominator are elected to the corporation’s board of directors, (c)
stockholders are not permitted to cumulate their votes for directors, and (d) the
election occurred, and the Expenses were incurred, after this bylaw’s adoption.
The amount paid to a Nominator under this bylaw in respect of a contested election
shall not exceed the amount expended by the corporation in connection with such
election.
CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 229–30; see also McEntee Letter, supra note 100, at enclosure.
102. McEntee Letter, supra note 100, at enclosure.
103. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 100, at 1. CA enclosed the opinion of its
Delaware counsel, Richard, Layton & Finger P.A., supporting CA’s assertion that the
proposal, if implemented, would violate Delaware law. See Letter from Richards, Layton &
Finger P.A. to CA, Inc. (Apr. 17, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/
ca14a8cert_att-a.pdf. The letter appears as Annex B to CA’s No-Action Request. See CA
No-Action Request, supra note 100, at enclosure.
104. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 100, at 3–6; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(i)(8) (2008) (permitting exclusion “[i]f the proposal relates to a nomination or an election
for membership on the company’s board of directors . . . or a procedure for such nomination
or election”).
105. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 100, at 6–8; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(i)(1) (permitting exclusion “[i]f the proposal is not a proper subject for action by
shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company’s organization”).
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proposal, if implemented, would cause CA to violate applicable law,106
and; (4) that the proposal ran contrary to the proxy rules. 107
In reply, AFSCME’s counsel stated that CA failed to meet its burden to
authorize exclusion under each basis claimed in its no-action request.108
CA’s counsel responded that the claimed bases for exclusion remained
valid and that AFSCME’s reply failed to address CA’s concerns about the
proposed bylaw. 109 The SEC rejected CA’s claims that the proposal related
to an election and ran contrary to the proxy rules, ultimately finding that
CA could not properly exclude the proposal on these grounds. 110
In addition, the SEC certified the remaining grounds for exclusion to the
Delaware Supreme Court “to secure [the court’s] determination of
significant questions of Delaware corporation law, and thereby assist the
[SEC] in applying [the applicable proxy rules] to CA’s no-action request
and to similar requests in the future.” To this end, the SEC’s General
Counsel submitted two certified questions of law regarding the proposed
bylaw’s status under Delaware law, 111 which the court accepted.112 The
two questions were: “(I) Is the AFSCME Proposal a proper subject for
action by shareholders as a matter of Delaware law? (II) Would the

106. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 100, at 6–8; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(i)(2) (permitting exclusion “[i]f the proposal would, if implemented, cause the company to
violate any state, federal, or foreign law to which it is subject”).
107. See CA No-Action Request, supra note 100, at 8–9; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a8(i)(3) (permitting exclusion “[i]f the proposal . . . is contrary to any of the Commission’s
proxy rules”).
108. Letter from Charles Jurgonis, Plan Sec’y, AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, to Office
of Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC 1–5 (May 21, 2008) [hereinafter AFSCME NoAction Response], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert_att-b.pdf.
AFSCME enclosed the opinion of its Delaware counsel, Grant & Eisenhofer P.A., discussing
why the proposed bylaw was indeed proper and would not violate Delaware law if
implemented. See Letter from Grant & Eisenhofer P.A. to Gerald W. McEntee, Chairman,
Pension Comm., AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan (May 16, 2008) [hereinafter G & E
Opinion], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert_att-b.pdf. The letter
appears as Exhibit A to AFSCME’s No-Action Response. See AFSCME No-Action
Response, supra, at enclosure.
109. Letter from David B. Harms, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, to Office of Chief Counsel,
Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC (June 3, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/
ca14a8cert_att-c.pdf.
110. CA, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 2568454, at *1 (June 27, 2008).
111. SEC, Cert’n of Questions of Law Arising from Rule 14a-8 Proposal by S’holder of
CA, Inc. at 2, ¶ 1(i) (June 27, 2008) [hereinafter SEC Certification], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert.pdf. A recent amendment to the Delaware
Constitution authorized the Delaware Supreme Court to hear questions of law certified by
the SEC. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8); An Act Concurring in a Proposed Amendment to
Article IV, Section 11 of the Delaware Constitution of 1897, as Amended, Relating to
Certification of Questions of Law to the Supreme Court, § 1, 76 Del. Laws 34 (2007); see
also DEL. SUP. CT. R. 41(a)(ii) (authorizing the certification procedure). The CA, Inc.
decision was the first time in which the SEC utilized this new certification. See Letter from
Brian G. Cartwright, Gen. Counsel, SEC, to Clerk, Sup. Ct. of Del. (June 27, 2008),
available at http://www.law.du.edu/images/uploads/corporate-governance/sec-governanceca-letter-cartwright.pdf.
112. Order Accepting Questions Certified from the SEC, CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps.
Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (No. 329, 2008).
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AFSCME Proposal, if adopted, cause CA to violate any Delaware law to
which it is subject?” 113
b. The First Certified Question: AFSCME’s Proposed Bylaw Is a Proper
Subject for Shareholder Action
As a threshold matter, the relative powers of CA’s board and
shareholders to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws.114 The court noted that
section 109(a) of the DGCL empowers both shareholders and directors of
Delaware corporations to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws, 115 and that
CA’s certificate of incorporation confers such power on CA’s board
pursuant to section 109(a), 116 with the result that both CA’s shareholders
and directors hold this power “independently and concurrently.” 117
Even though the bylaw power of shareholders is “legally sacrosanct,”118
the court stipulated that shareholders still do not share an “identical and
coextensive” power to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws with the board of
directors, given the broad grant of managerial power to the board under
DGCL section 141(a). 119 Indeed, a cardinal precept of Delaware law is that
directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of the
corporation. 120 A board’s management prerogatives therefore necessarily
check shareholders’ bylaw power. 121
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the precise task
before it was to delineate the “scope of shareholder action that Section
109(b) permits yet does not improperly intrude upon the directors’ power to
manage [the corporation] under Section 141(a),” 122 and to determine
whether AFSCME’s proposed bylaw actually falls within that permissible
scope. 123
To this point, CA asserted that AFSCME’s proposed bylaw must fall
outside the scope of permissible shareholder action because it would restrict

113. SEC Certification, supra note 111, at 4.
114. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231–33.
115. Id. at 231 (“‘[T]he power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws shall be in the
stockholders entitled to vote . . . ; provided, however, any corporation may, in its certificate
of incorporation, confer the power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws upon the directors.’”
(quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a))).
116. CA, Inc., Restated Certificate of Incorporation art. VII, § 2 (Mar. 8, 2006) (“[T]he
power to make, alter, or repeal, the By Laws, and to adopt any new By Law . . . shall be
vested in the Board of Directors.”). CA’s restated certificate of incorporation appears as
exhibit 3.3 to CA’s Form 8-K filed March 6, 2006. See CA, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K)
exhibit 3.3 (Mar. 6, 2006).
117. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231.
118. Id. at 232 (noting that shareholders’ bylaw power cannot be “non-consensually
eliminated or limited by anyone other than” the Delaware General Assembly).
119. Id. (“‘The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .’” (quoting DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a))).
120. Id. (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 234.
123. Id. at 232.
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the board’s authority to decide whether to reimburse, and DGCL section
102(b)(1) provides that any such limitation on the board’s power must
appear in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation, not in its bylaws.124
The court rejected this argument, 125 however, in favor of AFSCME’s
contention that section 109(b) permits bylaws relating to shareholders’
rights, and AFSCME’s proposed bylaw would relate to shareholders’ right
to participate in the director election process.126
Acknowledging that it could not capably “articulate with doctrinal
exactitude a bright line” that divides valid and invalid shareholder bylaws,
the court suggested that proper bylaws may “define the process and
procedures” for board decision making without mandating “specific
substantive business decisions.” 127 As such, the court ultimately framed the
first certified question as whether AFSCME’s proposed bylaw either
“establishes or regulates” a process for director decision making or
mandates the decision itself. 128
The court observed that a bylaw that “requires the expenditure of
corporate funds does not, for that reason alone, become automatically
deprived of its process-related character.” 129 Therefore, the court found
that it must look to the bylaw’s context and purpose in determining whether
it is process-related. 130 With respect to AFSCME’s proposed bylaw, the
context was the director election process, in which shareholders have a
“legitimate and protected interest,”131 while the purpose was to promote the
integrity of that process by facilitating shareholder participation.132

124. Id. at 233–34 (The certificate of incorporation may contain “‘[a]ny provision for the
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any
provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the
directors and the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders’” (quoting DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(1))).
125. See id. at 234 (observing that CA’s argument, “taken to its logical extreme,” would
eliminate shareholders’ rights to adopt bylaws altogether).
126. See id. at 233; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (2001) (“The bylaws may
contain any provision, not inconsistent with law or with the certificate of incorporation,
relating to the business of the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and its rights or powers
or the rights or powers of its stockholders, directors, officers or employees.”).
127. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 234–35. The court also pointed to certain sections of the
DGCL as examples of proper bylaws. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (Supp. 2010)
(bylaws setting number of directors and establishing board quorum and voting
requirements); id. § 141(f) (bylaws precluding board action without meeting); id. § 211(a)–
(b) (2001) (bylaws to establish date and location of annual stockholders meeting); id.
§ 211(d) (2001) (bylaws specifying the conditions for calling special stockholders meetings);
id. § 216 (Supp. 2010) (bylaws establishing stockholders meeting quorum and voting
requirements); id. § 222 (Supp. 2010) (bylaws regulating notice requirements for adjourned
stockholders meetings).
128. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 235.
129. Id. at 236.
130. Id. at 236–37.
131. Id. at 237 & n.21 (“‘Delaware courts have long exercised a most sensitive and
protective regard for the free and effective exercise of voting rights.’” (quoting Blasius
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988))).
132. Id.
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Though AFSCME “infelicitously couched [its proposal] as a substantivesounding mandate,” the bylaw’s procedural nature would have been clear
had its language emphasized shareholders’ entitlement to reimbursement
rather than the board’s obligation to reimburse.133 Thus, the court answered
the first certified question affirmatively, holding that AFSCME’s proposed
bylaw was indeed a proper subject for shareholder action. 134
c. The Second Certified Question: AFSCME’s Proposed Bylaw Would
Cause the CA Board to Violate Delaware Law
Having determined that AFSCME’s proposed bylaw would comply with
the DGCL and CA’s certificate of incorporation, the Delaware Supreme
Court observed that the second certified question before it was whether the
bylaw would violate Delaware decisional law. 135 Moreover, since CA’s
challenge preempted the bylaw’s adoption, this issue failed to present the
court with a concrete application of the bylaw to a specific set of facts,
which would ordinarily inform the court’s analysis. 136 Because the second
certified question demanded “a determination of the validity of the [b]ylaw
in the abstract,” the CA, Inc. court recognized that it must consider the
bylaw’s validity in “any possible circumstance under which a board of
directors might be required to act.”137
As a result, the court concluded that the board’s compliance with the
bylaw would breach its fiduciary duties in at least one “hypothetical,”
thereby rendering the bylaw invalid under Delaware law. 138 Specifically, a
board may properly reimburse shareholders’ reasonable proxy expenses
when a proxy contest 139 is based upon a “question of policy as
distinguished from personnel o[r] management.” 140 Nevertheless, when the
election is driven by “personal or petty concerns,” or to promote interests
that may be injurious to the corporation, the board’s fiduciary duties
“compel that reimbursement be denied altogether.”141 Thus, the court held
AFSCME’s proposed bylaw invalid in line with its prohibition against
contracts committing the board to action in breach of its fiduciary duties. 142
133. Id. at 235, 236 n.20.
134. Id. at 237.
135. Id. at 238.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. A “proxy contest” is defined as a “struggle between two corporate factions to obtain
the votes of uncommitted shareholders” that usually occurs “when a group of dissident
shareholders mounts a battle against the corporation’s managers.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 1346.
140. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240 (alteration in original) (citing Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight
Picture Screen Corp., 171 A. 226, 227 (Del. Ch. 1934)); cf. Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc.,
457 A.2d 339, 345 (Del. 1983) (permitting reimbursement of proxy expenses where the
proxy contest “was actually one involving substantive differences about corporation
policy.”).
141. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240.
142. Id. at 238 (citing Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998);
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994)).
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To reach its holding, the Delaware Supreme Court relied heavily on its
QVC 143 and Quickturn 144 merger and takeover decisions as precedent in
support of its reasoning. 145 In QVC, the court voided a merger agreement’s
“no-shop” provision to prevent a board from intervening bids; 146 in
Quickturn, the court invalidated a “no hand” pill that would preclude a
board’s successor from redeeming its poison pill for six months. 147
Without comment on the dissimilarities of these cases to CA, Inc., the court
held them up as examples in which the court “invalidated contracts that
would require a board to act or not act in such a fashion that would limit the
exercise of their fiduciary duties.” 148 Moreover, the court found two
specific issues irrelevant to its analysis: (1) that CA’s shareholders (and not
the board itself) would bind the board through the proposed bylaw, 149 and
(2) that the proposed bylaw would effectively relieve the board of its duties
concerning the decision to reimburse. 150 Put simply, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that QVC and Quickturn were controlling, despite
factual differences with CA, Inc., because AFSCME’s proposed bylaw
amounted to an internal governance contract that would mandate
reimbursement even “in circumstances that a proper application of fiduciary
principles could preclude.”151
Nevertheless, the court urged in its conclusion that AFSCME’s proposed
bylaw would be valid if it contained a fiduciary out provision reserving to
CA’s directors “full power to exercise their fiduciary duty” in
reimbursement decisions. 152 The court also suggested, perhaps less
vigorously, that AFSCME seek to amend CA’s certificate of incorporation
to include the proposed bylaw’s substance, or to encourage the Delaware
General Assembly to amend the DGCL to authorize proxy expense
reimbursement bylaws. 153 Without a fiduciary out, however, the court held

143. QVC, 637 A.2d at 34; see supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
144. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291–92; see supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
145. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238–39.
146. Id. at 238 (citing QVC, 637 A.2d at 51); see also supra notes 71–74 and
accompanying text.
147. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238–39 (citing Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291–92) see also
supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
148. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 238.
149. See id. at 239 (characterizing this as a “distinction . . . without a difference”).
150. See id. at 239–40 (characterizing this argument as more “semantical than
substantive” and as conceding “the very proposition” that renders the bylaw invalid).
151. Id. at 239–40. Given the Delaware Supreme Court’s reliance on QVC and
Quickturn, it seems unusual that the Court failed to mention its related decision in Omnicare,
which originated the fiduciary out requirement that the court ultimately extended to
mandatory bylaws in CA, Inc. One commentator who noticed this omission hypothesized
that the court did not rely or cite Omnicare in its CA, Inc. decision due to the “considerable
backlash and criticism” that the Omnicare decision produced. Ursaner, supra note 96, at
500–01; see also supra note 96 (describing Omnicare’s dissenting opinions and subsequent
commentary).
152. CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240.
153. Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (Supp. 2010) (establishing that both
the board of directors and a majority of stockholders must approve any amendment to a
corporation’s certificate of incorporation).
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that the bylaw, if implemented, would indeed violate Delaware law,
answering the second certified question in the affirmative. 154
d. CA Inc.’s Modest Impact on Delaware Law
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. has been a subject of
considerable analysis. 155 Nonetheless, CA, Inc.’s impact on Delaware
decisional and statutory law has been quite limited in the years following
the decision.
In the years following the CA, Inc. decision courts have only cited that
case as authority in support of rudimentary points of Delaware law. CA,
Inc. has been cited in subsequent cases to buttress the following
propositions: (1) de novo review is the appropriate standard of review for a
certified question of law; 156 (2) a board whose certificate of incorporation
has conferred the power to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws pursuant to
section 109(a) of the DGCL may adopt a bylaw as long as the bylaw is
valid under Delaware law; 157 (3) shareholders’ statutory power to amend
bylaws is not coextensive with the board’s concurrent bylaw power and is
limited by the board’s management prerogatives; 158 and (4) bylaws
represent a contract between a corporation and its shareholders.159 Thus,
the CA, Inc. decision has had limited influence on subsequent case law, and
this case law has failed to interpret the CA, Inc. decision’s impact on other
mandatory bylaws.
Notwithstanding the limited reach of CA, Inc.’s influence on subsequent
case law, the Delaware General Assembly adopted statutory reforms in
2009 to codify the Delaware Supreme Court’s answer to CA, Inc.’s first
certified question by expressly authorizing shareholder-proposed bylaws to
regulate the director election process.160 To this end, the new section 113
of the DGCL 161 permits Delaware corporations to adopt a proxy expense
reimbursement bylaw. 162
154. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240.
155. See infra Part II.B.
156. See Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph Schlanger 2006 Ins. Trust, 28 A.3d 436,
438 n.3 (Del. 2011) (citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231); PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Price Dawe
2006 Ins. Trust ex rel. Christiana Bank & Trust Co., 28 A.3d 1059, 1064 n.3 (Del. 2011)
(citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231); Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 3 A.3d 277, 281 n.8 (Del. 2010)
(citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 231).
157. See Kurz v. Holbrook, 989 A.2d 140, 157 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d
at 231–32) (concerning a bylaw amendment purporting to reduce the size of the board).
158. See In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 5377, 2010 WL 2705147, at *10 &
n.12 (Del. Ch. July 5, 2010) (citing CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 232) (finding that Delaware law
calls for a “consistently board-centric approach” in cases of controller tender offers).
159. See Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing CA, Inc.,
953 A.2d at 239) (considering the enforceability of a venue provision in a corporation’s
bylaws).
160. See An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to the General
Corporation Law, §§ 1–2, 77 Del. Laws ch. 14 (2009), available at http://delcode.delaware.
gov/sessionlaws/ga145/Chp014.pdf.
161. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 113 (Supp. 2010).
162. See Michael Tumas & John Grossbauer, Amendments to the Delaware Corporation
Code, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 28, 2009, 4:24
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Notably, section 113 does not require that a proxy expense
reimbursement bylaw contain a fiduciary out provision for directors, as CA,
Inc. required of AFSCME’s proposed bylaw. 163 Nevertheless, it seems
likely that a court interpreting section 113 may decide that the CA, Inc.
decision implicitly requires some fiduciary out provision. 164
B. Mandatory Advancement Bylaws
This section begins by introducing the policies underlying Delaware’s
permissive indemnification and advancement regime. Next, it describes
directors’ statutory entitlement to indemnification and advancement. It then
examines the relationship between directors’ indemnification and
advancement rights. Part I.B concludes by explaining the difficulty posed
by mandatory advancement bylaws, and describing the contours of
directors’ advancement entitlement under such bylaws.
1. Indemnification and Advancement Under DGCL Section 145
Along with fiduciary duties, directors’ entitlements to indemnification of
liabilities and to advancement of legal defense expenses comprise another
important aspect of corporate law. 165 Section 145 of the DGCL serves as
the statutory basis for corporate indemnification and advancement in
Delaware. 166
Delaware courts have recognized that indemnification and advancement
jointly serve two discrete objectives: (1) attracting competent directors and
officers, and (2) encouraging these managers to resist legal action perceived
PM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2009/02/28/proposed-amendments-to-thedelaware-general-corporation-law-2/. In the same statute, the Delaware General Assembly
also amended the DGCL to include a new section 112, which authorizes Delaware
corporations to adopt a “proxy access” bylaw granting stockholders the right to include in
the corporation’s proxy materials stockholders’ nominees for directors. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 112; see also Tumas & Grossbauer, supra.
163. D. Gordon Smith, Matthew Wright, & Marcus Kai Hintze, Private Ordering with
Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 158 (2011).
164. See id. Given the apparent significance of the CA, Inc. decision and its subsequent
codification in section 113, it is notable that Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. of the
Delaware Court of Chancery remarked in the lone decision to comment on section 113 since
its adoption that the new amendments “ma[de] plain that which had always been understood
by most Delaware corporate lawyers.” Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d
310, 356 n.244 (Del. Ch. 2010) (rejecting the shareholder plaintiff’s argument that sections
112 and 113 represented a policy shift that should have invalidated the poison pill at issue in
that case).
165. See, e.g., Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability: Advancement
of Legal Expenses, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 2004, at 5 (explaining that indemnification and
advancement, along with directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and DGCL § 102(b)(7),
represent “a cornerstone of the effort to reduce the risk of personal liability arising out of
board conduct”). Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL authorizes a provision in a corporation’s
certificate of incorporation to eliminate or limit the liability of directors for damages
resulting from non-intentional, non-bad faith breaches of duty. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (“[T]he certificate of incorporation may also contain . . . [a] provision
eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director.”).
166. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001 & Supp. 2010).
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to be meritless. 167 While courts construe bylaws furnishing indemnification
and advancement using established rules of contract interpretation, they
“simultaneously apply the patina of section 145’s policy” in their
decisions 168 and must “eschew narrow construction of [section 145] where
an overliteral reading would disserve these policies.”169
Moreover, Delaware courts have observed that indemnification and
advancement actually benefit the corporation more than the director. A
liberal corporate indemnification and advancement policy eliminates “the
chilling effect of potential personal liability” on the part of directors,
thereby encouraging the flexible board decision making and prudent risk
taking that benefits all corporate constituencies. 170 Thus, indemnification
and advancement do not represent an “individual benefit arising from
personal employment [but the] desirable underwriting of risk by the
corporation in anticipation of greater corporate-wide rewards.” 171
2. Indemnification of Directors’ Liabilities
Section 145 authorizes a corporation to indemnify172 its directors for
certain specified liabilities depending on the type of action brought against
the director. 173 When a shareholder brings a direct action against a
corporate director, 174 section 145(a) permits a corporation to indemnify a
director for attorney’s fees and any judgments, fines, or settlement amounts
To qualify for
the director actually and reasonably incurs. 175
indemnification in a particular case, the director must have acted in good
faith and for a purpose she reasonably believed to be in the corporation’s
best interests. 176 Notably, termination of a direct action by judgment or
167. VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998) (noting that Delaware
courts “have long recognized that section 145 serves the dual policies of: (a) allowing
corporate officials to resist unjustified lawsuits, secure in the knowledge that, if vindicated,
the corporation will bear the expense of litigation; and (b) encouraging capable women and
men to serve as corporate directors and officers, secure in the knowledge that the corporation
will absorb the costs of defending their honesty and integrity” (citing Hibbert v. Hollywood
Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 344 (Del. 1983))).
168. Reinhard & Kreinberg v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 3003, 2008 WL 868108, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 28, 2008).
169. VonFeldt, 714 A.2d at 84.
170. Scharf v. Edgcomb Corp., No. 15224, 1997 WL 762656, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4,
1997) (“Analyzing director and officer indemnification provisions as if they were salary,
company cars or other personal corporate prerequisites [sic] simply makes no sense.”).
171. Id.
172. “Indemnification” is defined as “[t]he action of compensating for loss or damage
sustained” and, alternatively, “compensation so made.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 77, at 837.
173. See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)–(b) (2001).
174. A “direct action” is defined as “[a] lawsuit to enforce a shareholder’s rights against a
corporation,” to which a director may be joined as a defendant. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 77, at 525–26.
175. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (“A corporation shall have power to indemnify any
person [in] any . . . suit or proceeding . . . (other than an action by or in the right of the
corporation) by reason of the fact that the person is or was a director . . . against expenses
(including attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement . . . .”).
176. Id.
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settlement does not by itself suggest that the director has failed to satisfy
this standard of conduct. 177
Section 145(b) authorizes a much narrower indemnification right in
derivative actions, 178 affording indemnification only for expenses actually
and reasonably incurred, such as attorney’s fees. 179 While the entitlement
requires the same standard of directorial conduct required in direct
actions, 180 section 145(b) does not afford indemnification for settlements
and judgments, as a director defending a derivative suit has allegedly
breached his fiduciary duties. 181 Despite this limitation, section 145(g)
permits insurance to cover such non-indemnifiable amounts.182
Indemnification of corporate directors is not self-executing; instead,
indemnification requires a determination that the director’s conduct
qualifies under section 145’s standard.183 Section 145 provides that such
determination may be made as follows: (1) by a majority vote of directors
who are not parties to the pertinent proceeding, even if less than a quorum
of the board; (2) by a committee of such non-defendant directors designated
by a majority of such directors, even if less than a quorum; (3) if there are
no non-defendant directors, or if such directors elect, by independent legal
counsel in a written opinion; or, (4) by a majority of the stockholders.184
Nevertheless, section 145 also dictates that corporations must indemnify
directors in certain circumstances. 185 Specifically, indemnification is
mandatory when a director has been “successful on the merits or otherwise”
in defense of any proceeding described in the statute, regardless of whether
his conduct satisfies the standard. 186
3. Advancement of Directors’ Litigation Expenses
In addition to indemnification for liabilities, section 145 also authorizes
advancement: corporate payment of a defendant director’s litigation
expenses (i.e., attorneys’ fees), which the director must repay if such

177. Id.
178. A “derivative action” is defined as “a suit asserted by a shareholder on the
corporation’s behalf against a third party [the director] because of the corporation’s failure to
take some action against the [director].” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 77, at 509.
179. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b).
180. See id.; see also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
181. McLaughlin, supra note 165. In contrast, a director defending a direct suit may
reasonably expect “broad corporate reimbursement” because she presumably acted in the
best interests of the corporation in injuring the plaintiff. Id.
182. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (“A corporation shall have power to purchase
and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director . . . against any
liability asserted against such person and incurred by such person . . . whether or not the
corporation would have the power to indemnify such person against such liability under this
section.”).
183. See McLaughlin, supra note 165.
184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (Supp. 2010).
185. See id. § 145(c) (2001).
186. Id.
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expenses are ultimately deemed non-indemnifiable. 187 Advancement,
which is an “especially important corollary” to indemnification in attracting
talented directors, provides “immediate interim relief from the personal
out-of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-going expenses
inevitably involved” with litigation defense.188
Like its grant of indemnification, Delaware’s scheme for advancement is
best characterized as permissive. 189 Corporations enjoy broad flexibility in
specifying the terms and conditions upon which directors may receive
advancement (such as a proof of ability to repay or posting of a secured
bond). 190 Unlike indemnification, advances to a director do not require a
determination that his conduct has met a minimum standard.191
While section 145 conditions advancement to current directors on an
“undertaking” that the director repay the corporation if advanced expenses
are ultimately ineligible for indemnification, the statute fails to “prescribe a
standard of solvency, require collateral, or specify minimum financial
requirements.” 192 Moreover, section 145 does not impose any conditions
on advances to former directors. 193
Although section 145 does not require corporations to advance legal
expenses, “a great many corporate charters, bylaws and [private]
indemnification
agreements”
include
mandatory
advancement

187. Id. § 145(e) (Supp. 2010) (“Expenses (including attorneys’ fees) incurred by . . . [a]
director of the corporation in defending any . . . suit or proceeding may be paid by the
corporation in advance of the final disposition of such action . . . upon receipt of an
undertaking by or on behalf of such director . . . to repay such amount if it shall ultimately be
determined that such person is not entitled to be indemnified by the corporation . . . .”).
188. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005).
189. See Richard A. Rossman, Matthew J. Lund & Kathy K. Lochman, A Primer on
Advancement of Defense Costs: The Rights and Duties of Officers and Corporations, 85 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 29, 34 (2007) (“[A]dvancement statutes of most states are described as
‘permissive’ because they establish only the ability of a corporation to grant advancement.”).
190. See Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212; see also Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 788 A.2d
111, 113 (Del. 2001) (holding that a corporation did not provide for advancement to the
broadest extent possible under the law but limited advancement to certain situations).
191. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability:
Consider the
Implications of Mandatory Advancement, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 14, 2008, at 5
(“Advancement . . . ordinarily is not conditioned on a finding that the party seeking
advancement has met any standard of conduct.”).
192. Regina Robson, Paying for Daniel Webster: Critiquing the Contract Model of
Advancement of Legal Fees in Criminal Proceedings, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 275, 280–81
(2011); see, e.g., Advanced Mining Sys., Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. Ch. 1992)
(“This undertaking [for advancement] need not be secured.”). Thus, any unsecured
undertaking by a director accused of criminal wrongdoing is “particularly hollow” because a
guilty verdict will not only render her advances ineligible for indemnification but will also
likely deprive her of adequate resources to repay the funds advanced. Robson, supra, at 280–
81.
193. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (Supp. 2010) (“Such expenses (including
attorneys’ fees) incurred by former directors . . . may be so paid upon such terms and
conditions, if any, as the corporation deems appropriate.”); see also Homestore, 888 A.2d at
211 (“Section 145(e) provides corporations with the flexibility to advance funds to former
corporate officials . . . without an express undertaking.”).
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provisions. 194 Such provisions often reproduce section 145’s language,
thereby granting an advancement entitlement “to the fullest extent of the
law.” 195 Where a mandate is in place, a director’s right to advancement is
enforceable as under a contract. 196 Moreover, section 145 imposes no limit
on the amount of corporate funds to be advanced under mandatory
provisions. 197
Section 145 vests the Delaware Court of Chancery with exclusive
jurisdiction over actions for advancement. 198 The scope of an advancement
proceeding is typically summary in nature,199 reflecting the policy
determination that the court “should be receptive to and accord expedited
treatment” to advancement claims. 200 Indeed, if advancement is not made
promptly, its benefit to a director is “forever lost” because the absence of
prompt advancement will influence what counsel and litigation strategy the
director can afford. 201 Advancement cases are particularly appropriate,
then, for “resolution on a paper record.” 202
4. The Relationship Between Indemnification and Advancement
Although they are typically correlative, indemnification and advancement
rights are legally separate and distinct.203 An extension of indemnification
rights concomitantly extends the amount by which a corporation may be
legally liable.204 A totally unrelated decision to advance expenses is,
essentially, the decision to advance credit to a director.205 Thus, an

194. E.g., Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212 (citing Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d
818 (Del. 1992)); id. (“Homestore’s bylaws contain[] a mandatory and unconditional
advancement provision.”); see also infra Part I.B.5.
195. Robson, supra note 192, at 284; see also Fricke, 623 A.2d at 83 (“[M]ost
corporations and virtually all public corporations have by bylaw exercised the authority
recognized by Section 145 so as to mandate the extension of indemnification [and
advancement] rights in circumstances in which indemnification [and advancement] would be
permissible under Section 145.”).
196. See Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 787 A.2d 102, 106 (Del. Ch. 2001).
197. Robson, supra note 192, at 306–07. Nevertheless, directors’ and officers’ liability
insurance policies typically cover advancement expenses. See id. at 295.
198. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(k) (2001).
199. See id. (“The Court of Chancery may summarily determine a corporation’s
obligation to advance expenses (including attorneys’ fees).”); see also Weinstock v. Lazard
Debt Recovery GP, LLP, No. 20048, 2003 WL 21843254, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2003)
(stating that “summary judgment practice is an efficient and appropriate method” to decide
most advancement disputes).
200. Bergonzi v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 20453, 2003 WL 22407303, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20,
2003).
201. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 886 A.2d 502, 505 (Del. 2005).
202. DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 1384, 2006 WL 224058, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan.
23, 2006). Summary advancement proceedings are inappropriate, however, for litigating
collateral indemnification or recoupment claims, which generally require more “detailed
analysis.” Kaung v. Cole Nat’l Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 510 (Del. 2005).
203. Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 212 (Del. 2005) (citing Kaung, 884 A.2d
at 509).
204. Advanced Mining Sys., Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. Ch. 1992).
205. Id.
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advancement right is not dependent on an indemnification right,206 and a
mandatory indemnification bylaw does not include an attendant
advancement obligation before it has been determined that indemnification
is proper. 207
Furthermore, a director is only entitled to mandatory indemnification
when he prevails “on the merits or otherwise” in defending a proceeding to
be entitled to indemnification.208 In contrast, section 145 evidently
contemplates an advancement right greater than this mandatory
indemnification right, as a director must repay expenses advanced when he
is ineligible for indemnification.209
5. The Scope of Mandatory Advancement Rights
The prevalence of mandatory advancement bylaws has accordingly
produced a “maddening” outcome in recent cases: an unconditional
corporate obligation to fund the legal defense of a director “the board
believes has acted against the interests of the corporation or even
criminally.” 210 In a common scenario, the board has already “drawn harsh
conclusions about the integrity and fidelity” of the director seeking
advancement, and it may even have a “firm basis to believe [the director]
intentionally injured the corporation.” 211 Understandably, the board is
reluctant to advance funds for his defense, “fearing that the funds will never
be paid back and resisting the idea of seeing further depletion of corporate
resources at the insistence of someone perceived to be a faithless
fiduciary.” 212
The Delaware Court of Chancery has asserted, however, that it is “no
answer” that the corporation has come to believe that the director has been
unfaithful. 213 Indeed, it is “in those very cases that the right to
advancement attaches most strongly.” 214 In fact, the court has criticized
boards denying advancement, in one case sarcastically labeling them “sage
businesspersons” seeking to escape “the consequences of their own
contractual freedom.” 215 Previously content with mandatory advancement
bylaws “drafted with holes large enough to drive a truck through,” suddenly
the board resembles “a sinner who finally finds religion . . . insisting on a
rigorous interpretation” of bylaws that only condition advancement on a
206. Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d
818, 826 (Del. 1992) (holding that an indemnification agreement’s exclusion of violations of
federal securities laws from indemnification had no impact on a director’s entitlement to
advancement to defend such claims).
207. Fricke, 623 A.2d at 84.
208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (2001).
209. See Fricke, 623 A.2d at 84.
210. McLaughlin, supra note 191 (citing Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. 19467,
2002 WL 1358761, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 18, 2002)).
211. Reddy, 2002 WL 1358761, at *5.
212. Id.
213. Radiancy, Inc. v. Azar, No. 1547, 2006 WL 4762868, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006).
214. Id.
215. DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., L.L.C., No. 1384, 2006 WL 224058, at *2, *13 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 23, 2006).
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Regretting the broad
“hollow, worthless promise to repay.” 216
advancement right it “forged on a clear day,” the board requests that the
court ignore the “plain language” of the bylaw to generate an “after-the-fact
judicial contract that reflects [its] current preference.”217
Nonetheless, the court reminds recalcitrant boards that section 145 does
not command that advancement provisions “be written broadly or in a
mandatory fashion.” 218 Where an advancement bylaw is, “by its plain
terms, expansively written and mandatory, it will be enforced as
written.” 219 It is not the court’s responsibility to “relieve sophisticated
parties of the burdens of contracts they wish they had drafted
A corporation that adopts a bylaw mandating
differently.” 220
unconditional, unsecured advancement “will be held to that decision and
will be deemed to have waived the opportunity to examine whether the
extension of credit to a particular [director] is in the corporation’s best
interests” when the advance is requested. 221 Indeed, the court “does not
relish and will not perform the task of playground monitor, refereeing
needless and inefficient skirmishes in the sandbox.” 222
In sum, where a corporation could easily have drafted a mandatory
advancement bylaw differently and did not, the board must “maintain its
bargain” with its director. 223 Because a director’s typically high level of
compensation would facilitate securing an undertaking for advancement,
any excuse “falls woefully short” of explaining a board’s failure to require
collateral. 224 In fact, the court has held that denying advancement due
would weaken section 145, 225 thereby undermining the beneficial public
policies it serves. 226 While stockholders regrettably “get it coming and

216. Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. 023, 2004 WL 556733, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22,
2004).
217. DeLucca, 2006 WL 224058, at *2.
218. Id. at *13.
219. Id.
220. Id. at *2.
221. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability: Indemnification Update,
N.Y. L.J., June 12, 2008, at 5.
222. Reinhard & Kreinberg v. Dow Chem. Co., No. 3003, 2008 WL 868108, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 28, 2008).
223. Bergonzi v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 20453, 2003 WL 22407303, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20,
2003).
224. Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. 023, 2004 WL 3053129, at *3 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27,
2004) (“People with far less substantial bank accounts than [directors] are required to post
secured bonds every day in [the Court of Chancery]. For a [director] being paid hundreds of
thousands of dollars or more a year in salary and benefits, this Court is hard pressed to
understand why it would be difficult to attract people to such positions if they were required
to post a bond to secure the advancement of fees and costs related to litigation arising from
their service in that capacity.”).
225. See Radiancy, Inc. v. Azar, No. 1547, 2006 WL 4762868, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23,
2006).
226. See Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. 19467, 2002 WL 1358761, at *5–6 (Del.
Ch. June 18, 2002).
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going” in advancement actions,227 the Delaware Court of Chancery has
categorically held that boards may not “unilaterally rescind” directors’
advancement rights. 228
As a result, it is vital to understand the advancement entitlement that a
mandatory advancement bylaw affords directors. The following sections
describe the circumstances in which advancement is available and the
potential arguments of boards seeking to avoid their obligation to advance.
a. Covered Directors
Section 145 authorizes indemnification in proceedings brought against a
person “by reason of the fact” that the person is a corporate director.229
Because a corporation may only advance potentially indemnifiable
expenses, advancement is also only available in suits brought against a
director due to her office. 230
As a result, the Delaware Court of Chancery has held that a mandatory
advancement bylaw entitles a director to advancement where there is a
“nexus or causal connection” between any of the underlying proceedings
contemplated by section 145(e) and the director’s official corporate
duties. 231 Such connection exists where the director’s corporate powers
were utilized to commit the alleged misconduct.232 Indeed, a claim
entitling a corporation to avoid advancement must clearly involve a
contractual obligation without any such nexus or causal connection to
official duties. 233
Notably, a director’s motivation for engaging in misconduct is ultimately
irrelevant to this analysis.234 In fact, precedent upholds advancement to
directors charged with serious misconduct even when this misconduct was
allegedly inspired by “personal greed.” 235 To justify this result, the Court
of Chancery has observed that it would be highly problematic if directors’
advancement rights depended on the motivation “ascribed to their conduct

227. Barrrett v. Am. Country Holdings, Inc., 951 A.2d 735, 746–47 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(noting that shareholder wealth ultimately bears the litigation expenses of both the director
and the company).
228. Bergonzi, 2003 WL 22407303, at *3.
229. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a)–(b) (2001).
230. See, e.g., Paolino v. Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc., 985 A.2d 392, 398 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(describing a bylaw granting “broad and mandatory advancement rights to any covered
person faced with ‘defending’ a ‘proceeding’ in which indemnification theoretically could be
available”).
231. See Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 213–14 (Del. 2005) (citing Perconti v.
Thornton Oil Corp., No. 18630, 2002 WL 982419, at *3–5 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2002)); see also
Perconti, 2002 WL 982419, at *6–8.
232. See Paolino, 985 A.2d at 406 (citing Bernstein v. TractManager, Inc., 953 A.2d
1003, 1011 (Del. Ch. 2007)).
233. See id. at 407.
234. Homestore, 888 A.2d at 213–14.
235. Reddy v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., No. 19467, 2002 WL 1358761, at *6 (Del. Ch. June
18, 2002).
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by the suing parties.” 236 Otherwise, a director might not be able to defend,
for example, a claim that she breached her duty of loyalty. 237
b. Covered Proceedings
Section 145 authorizes advancement to directors “in defending” a
contemplated proceeding. 238 When a claim, counterclaim, or third party
claim has been asserted against a director, she is defending that proceeding
and is entitled to advancement.239 A director may also be defending against
threatened claims when the board engages in discovery of the director in the
director’s own claim against the corporation.240
Moreover, a director is entitled to advancement of the costs of both
asserting affirmative defenses 241 and appealing a conviction. 242 Asserting a
counterclaim comprises defending when (1) the counterclaim would qualify
as a compulsory counterclaim under Delaware and federal civil procedure,
and (2) the counterclaim “so directly relates to a claim against a [director]
such that success on the counterclaim would operate to defeat the
affirmative claims” against the director.243 Furthermore, a director is
entitled to advancement of fees to assert defamation claims as part of her
litigation strategy. 244
c. Duration of Coverage
A person is not automatically entitled to advancement rights upon
becoming a director or even upon accrual of the cause of action for which
advancement is sought.245 Rather, advancement rights vest “when the
director is named in a proceeding for which advancement is available, or
some firm indication exists (such as an investigation)” that the potential
claimant is contemplating claims against the director.246
A corporation must provide advancement to a director until the
underlying proceeding is resolved, “in the sense that its outcome is not
subject to further disturbance.” 247 Put simply, the advancement obligation
236. See id. at *5.
237. Id. (noting that if directors’ motivation influenced their advancement entitlement,
directors would not be able to defend “claims that they took official action for the primary
purpose of diverting corporate resources to their own pocketbooks”).
238. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (Supp. 2010).
239. Paolino v. Mace Sec. Int’l, Inc., 985 A.2d 392, 400 (Del. Ch. 2009).
240. Schoon v. Troy, 948 A.2d 1157, 1170 (Del. Ch. 2008).
241. Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 603 A.2d 818, 824 (Del. 1992).
242. Sun-Times Media Grp., Inc. v. Black, 954 A.2d 380, 398 (Del. Ch. 2008).
243. Zaman v. Amedeo Holdings, Inc., No. 3115, 2008 WL 2168397, at *35–36 (Del. Ch.
May 23, 2008) (“In other words, a counterclaim fits within the ‘in defending’ language if it
defends the corporate official by directly responding to and negating the affirmative
claim.”).
244. See Duthie v. CorSolutions Med., Inc., No. 3048, 2008 WL 4173850, at *1 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 10, 2008).
245. See McLaughlin, supra note 221 (citing Schoon, 948 A.2d at 1165–66).
246. Id.
247. Black, 954 A.2d at 395.
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does not terminate until the non-appealable conclusion of a proceeding.248
For example, a director who has entered a guilty plea before sentencing
remains entitled to advancement, as his plea did not represent the
proceedings’ final disposition. 249
d. Rejected Defenses
In recent cases, the Delaware Court of Chancery has rejected several
defenses raised by recalcitrant boards to excuse noncompliance with a
mandatory advancement bylaw. These include severe financial hardship250
and a corporation’s inchoate recoupment claim. 251 Even clear evidence that
advanced expenses will not be indemnified—such as a director’s sworn
admission to deliberate falsification of financial statements—does not
comprise a valid excuse. 252 A claim that the director fraudulently induced
an employment agreement is equally unavailing, but the court has granted
that the board may assert this claim in a separate action against the
director. 253
e. The Potential Defense of Fiduciary Duty
One novel defense that boards have not raised in defending advancement
claims is that advancement in a particular instance would constitute a
breach of the board’s fiduciary duties. To this end, a board might claim that
advancement represents gross mismanagement of corporate assets,
amounting to a breach of the board’s duty of care.254 Alternatively, a board
could argue that a decision to extend advancement to one of its member
directors is a self-interested transaction in breach of the board’s duty of
loyalty. 255
While no advancement case in Delaware has yet considered this defense,
an interesting string of decisions from federal courts in Pennsylvania and
Delaware, and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, may shed some
light on this defense’s viability before the Delaware Court of Chancery.

248. See id. at 397.
249. See Bergonzi v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 20453, 2003 WL 22407303, at *2 (Del Ch. Oct.
20, 2003).
250. See Tafeen v. Homestore, Inc., No. 023, 2004 WL 556733, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22,
2004).
251. See Kaung v. Cole Nat’l Corp., 884 A.2d 500, 502 (Del. 2005) (holding that the
summary nature of an advancement proceeding made hearing a counterclaim for recoupment
inappropriate).
252. See Tafeen, 2004 WL 556733, at *4–5.
253. See Bergonzi, 2003 WL 22407303, at *3 (holding that a contract providing for
advancement precludes an inquiry into whether claimant will qualify for indemnification).
254. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
255. Travis Laster, CA v. AFSCME: The Delaware Supreme Court Giveth and the
Supreme Court Taketh Away, DEALLAWYERS.COM BLOG (July 18, 2008, 7:29 AM),
http://www.deallawyers.com/blog/archives/000924.html; see also supra notes 47–48 and
accompanying text.
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In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Felicetti,256 the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered claims of former
directors of a Pennsylvania corporation to advancement under a mandatory
advancement bylaw to defend claims asserted against them by the
corporation. 257 Granting that the advancement bylaw did not directly
conflict with the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law’s advancement
provision, 258 the court found that the bylaw ran “contrary to the fiduciary
obligations imposed upon directors” under Pennsylvania law and the
bylaws. 259 The bylaw could not supersede the overriding duty of the
directors to act in the best interest of the corporation, which, the court
determined, dictated that advancement be denied in this case. 260 Thus, the
corporation successfully avoided advancement to the former directors. 261
Two years later, Ridder v. CityFed Financial Corp. 262 involved
employees of a Delaware corporation seeking advancement under the
corporation’s mandatory advancement bylaw to defend suits brought
against them by the receiver of the parent corporation. 263 The Third Circuit
rejected the defendant’s argument that the court adopt the approach taken in
Felicetti, concluding that it was required to follow the decisions of
Delaware courts concerning issues of Delaware law. 264 Moreover, the
court found the reasoning in Felicetti unpersuasive because, the court
asserted, “[r]arely, if ever, could it be a breach of fiduciary duty . . . to
comply with the requirements of the corporation’s by-laws, as expressly
authorized by [section 145].” 265
Only ten months later, in Neal v. Neumann Medical Center, 266 the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania considered the claims of former
officers against a Pennsylvania nonprofit corporation to enjoin the
corporation’s suit against the officers until the corporation advanced the
officers’ defense costs, pursuant to a mandatory advancement bylaw.267
The court declined to follow Felicetti, and instead adopted the Ridder
256. 830 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
257. Id. at 263–65.
258. The Pennsylvania Business Corporation Act’s advancement provision is modeled in
part on section 145 of the DGCL. See id. at 266 (“Most states have adopted legislation which
is modeled after either the Delaware [General] Corporation Law . . . § 145, or the Model
Business Corporation Act . . . . Pennsylvania’s indemnification provision is a hybrid of the
two.”); see also 15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1745 (West Supp. 2011).
259. Felicetti, 830 F. Supp. at 268–69.
260. See id. at 269 (“In this case, the [directors] are backed into a corner by
simultaneously being required by [the bylaws] to advance the expenses of this lawsuit to [the
defendant directors] and being bound by their fiduciary duties to act only in the best interest
of the corporation, actions which the directors have definitively decided are irreconcilable.”).
261. See id. at 269–70.
262. 47 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 1995).
263. Id. at 86.
264. See id. at 87.
265. Id.
266. 667 A.2d 479 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995).
267. Id. at 480. The Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Act’s advancement provision is
modeled in part on section 145 of the DGCL. Id. at 484 (Smith, J., dissenting) (describing
the advancement provision as “a hybrid between Delaware provisions and the Model
Business Corp. Act”); see also 15 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5745 (West Supp. 2011).
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court’s reasoning, asserting that “directors can only act in the corporation’s
best interests by implementing the mandatory advancement provision, since
the bylaws which contain it were presumably adopted for [the
corporation’s] benefit.” 268
Each of these decisions addresses whether a board’s compliance with a
mandatory advancement bylaw may cause it to breach its fiduciary duties.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. that a mandatory bylaw
is indeed invalid for that reason seems to set the stage for a board seeking to
deny advancement to make the same argument.
II. TALKING OUT OF BOTH SIDES OF YOUR MOUTH:
THE IMPACT OF CA, INC. ON MANDATORY ADVANCEMENT BYLAWS
Part II analyzes the conflict between the CA, Inc. decision and the general
enforceability of mandatory advancement bylaws. First, it explores the
parties’ arguments in CA, Inc. that compare the proposed bylaw in that case
to mandatory advancement bylaws. It then reviews commentary by
relevant practitioners that discuss the CA, Inc. decision’s potential impact
on mandatory advancement bylaws.
A. The Parties’ Arguments in CA, Inc. Recognize a Link
It is telling that AFSCME, in its CA, Inc. brief, likened its proposed
bylaw to mandatory advancement bylaws, whose validity is well
established. 269 With respect to the second certified question, AFSCME
advanced two arguments that drew on parallels to mandatory advancement
bylaws.
First, AFSCME argued that valid bylaws may mandate payment of
corporate funds without improperly interfering with the directors’ fiduciary
duties. 270 As an example, AFSCME pointed out that Delaware courts
regularly enforce mandatory advancement bylaws. 271 While section 145
expressly authorizes advancement, it does not mandate advancement in any
circumstance and remains silent with respect to the adoption of
advancement bylaws. 272 Nevertheless, virtually all public corporations
guarantee advancement in their bylaws,273 and, where a mandatory
advancement bylaw exists, such rights are enforced as a contract. 274
Second, AFSCME argued that a mandatory bylaw cannot cause a board
to violate its fiduciary duties because directors are not “called upon to
exercise any discretion on the payment itself” where such a provision
268. Neal, 667 A.2d at 482 (majority opinion).
269. See generally Brief of Appellee at 27–39, CA, Inc. (No. 329, 2008).
270. See id. at 31.
271. Id. at 28 (citing Underbrink v. Warrior Energy Servs. Corp., No. 2982, 2008 WL
2262316 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008); Orloff v. Shulman, No. 852, 2005 WL 5750635 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 23, 2005)).
272. Id. at 29 (citing VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 81 (Del. 1998)).
273. See id. at 30 (citing VonFeldt, 714 A.2d at 81).
274. See id. at 30 (citing Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 787 A.2d 102, 106 (Del. Ch.
2001)).
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Again, AFSCME employed the example of mandatory
exists. 275
advancement bylaws, which do not implicate the directors’ business
judgment regarding the advancement decision. 276 Instead, advancement in
such cases is required, “just like the terms of any other contract.”277
In its reply brief, CA elected not to rebut these arguments directly. 278 In
fact, CA only referred to mandatory advancement bylaws in its discussion
of the first certified question,279 criticizing a citation in the opinion of
AFSCME’s Delaware counsel enclosed as part of AFSCME’s response to
CA’s no-action request. 280 There, CA asserted that reliance on a case
enforcing a mandatory advancement bylaw was inapposite because
advancement is a matter that section 145 “specifically provides may be
regulated” by law, whereas AFSCME’s proposed bylaw lacked express
statutory authorization. 281
The Delaware Supreme Court clearly held in CA, Inc. that a bylaw is
invalid if it mandates corporate expenditures in circumstances where a
proper application of fiduciary principles might preclude such payments,
and that a fiduciary out provision could cure this defect.282 Following the
CA, Inc. decision, however, the Delaware General Assembly acted to
nullify CA’s argument that AFSCME’s proposed bylaw ought not to be
treated like valid mandatory advancement bylaws. 283 DGCL section 113
now specifically authorizes corporations to adopt mandatory proxy expense
reimbursement bylaws, 284 placing AFSCME’s proposed bylaw and
mandatory advancement bylaws adopted pursuant to DGCL section 145 on
equivalent statutory footing. 285 In fact, absent this distinction, AFSCME’s
argument that mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaws and
mandatory advancement bylaws occupy the same legal status seems
persuasive indeed. 286
These points lead to one inevitable conclusion. Where mandatory
advancement bylaws are valid and enforceable without fiduciary outs, then
mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaws must also be valid without
fiduciary outs. In the CA, Inc. decision, however, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that a mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaw lacking a
275. Id. at 37.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See generally Brief of Appellant, CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953
A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (No. 329, 2008).
279. Id. at 37.
280. See G & E Opinion, supra note 108, at 4 (citing Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc., 787
A.2d 102, 106 (Del. Ch. 2001)).
281. Brief of Appellant, supra note 278, at 37 & n.21 (arguing that section 145 is a
“statutory exception to the general rule” of board discretion under section 141(a)).
282. See CA, Inc., 953 A.2d at 240.
283. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text (describing the new section 113 of
the DGCL).
284. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 113 (Supp. 2010).
285. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e).
286. See supra notes 270–78 and accompanying text.
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fiduciary out is invalid and unenforceable. It follows that a mandatory
advancement bylaw without a fiduciary out must be invalid as well.
B. Practitioner Commentary Analyzes the Implications
Two accounts interpreting CA, Inc.’s impact on mandatory advancement
bylaws are particularly valuable in interpreting this conflict. The first is an
article by AFSCME’s Delaware counsel that details the CA, Inc. case.287
There, the authors highlight the Delaware Supreme Court’s perceived
failure to (1) distinguish the legal status of mandatory advancement bylaws
from AFSCME’s proposed proxy expense reimbursement bylaw, and (2) to
explain why CA, Inc.’s holding would not disturb mandatory advancement
bylaws. 288
Absent this explanation, the authors are left to speculate: if a bylaw
cannot require mandatory reimbursement of proxy expenses without a
fiduciary out, “how can a bylaw require mandatory advancement of
expenses without a fiduciary out? And, if a fiduciary out is necessary,
[thereby permitting a board to avoid mandatory advancement,] is there
really such a thing as mandatory advancement of expenses after CA,
Inc.?” 289 In light of this ambiguity, the authors contend that “many
directors now fear that their protection of ‘mandatory’ advancement of
expenses is now subject to the Board’s fiduciary duty at the time of the
request.” 290
The second relevant commentary is that of Travis Laster, a Vice
Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery who analyzed the CA, Inc.
decision before taking the bench. 291 Echoing AFSCME’s counsel, Laster
observed that CA, Inc.’s fiduciary out requirement represents a “fiduciary
trump card,” with the result that mandatory bylaws “may no longer be
mandatory.” 292
According to Laster, litigation over mandatory advancement represents
the most obvious situation in which a conflict between fiduciary duties and
a mandatory bylaw can arise.293 Of course, courts have enforced
mandatory advancement bylaws even where a board “believes the recipient
[director] is a bad actor and that it would be a breach of the board’s duties

287. Stuart M. Grant & John C. Kairis, Shareholder Proposals for Reimbursement of
Expenses Incurred in Proxy Contests: Recent Guidance from the Delaware Supreme Court,
in WHAT ALL BUSINESS LAWYERS MUST KNOW ABOUT DELAWARE LAW DEVELOPMENTS
2009, at 519, 526–33 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 19172,
2009), WL 1740 PLI/Corp 519. Grant and Kairis are Directors of Grant & Eisenhofer P.A.
and served as counsel to AFSCME in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan.
288. See id. at 534–35.
289. Id. at 534.
290. Id. at 535.
291. See Laster, supra note 255. Laster was sworn in as Vice Chancellor of the Delaware
Court of Chancery on October 9, 2009. Court of Chancery Judicial Officers, DEL. ST. CTS.,
http://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/judges.stm (last visited Feb. 23, 2012) (select “J. Travis
Laster” tab).
292. See Laster, supra note 255.
293. See id.
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to provide the advancements.” 294 Nevertheless, CA, Inc.’s prescribed
fiduciary out serves to restore broad discretion to the board whenever
circumstances implicate its fiduciary duties. 295
Laster envisions two scenarios occurring at a corporation that has
adopted a mandatory advancement bylaw with a fiduciary out. 296 First, the
board elects to advance a particular expense, either confident that its
fiduciary duties dovetail with the bylaw, or uncertain of what decision its
fiduciary duties require and hesitant to violate the bylaw. 297 Following CA,
Inc., directors that act in reliance on a mandatory bylaw can be “secondguessed” on the ground that their fiduciary duties actually required them not
to advance. 298 Thus, a board’s decision to advance despite a fiduciary out
will, predictably, expose the board to breach of fiduciary duty actions by
shareholders. 299
Alternatively, the board may deny advancement, arguing that a
mandatory advancement bylaw cannot preclude operation of its fiduciary
duties, and that it therefore has the discretion to avoid the obligation to
Indeed, Laster predicts that the next development in
advance. 300
advancement jurisprudence will feature boards making this very claim.301
While this argument was not, in fact, viable under advancement
jurisprudence before the CA, Inc. decision, Laster posits that it could be
asserted in good faith following CA, Inc. 302
Ultimately, Laster expects that Delaware courts will “find a way” to
uphold mandatory advancement bylaws. 303 He points out, however, that
reaching such a result will require that courts distinguish advancement
actions from CA, Inc., without specifying how this can be achieved.304 One
expects that Laster, as Vice Chancellor, will play an instrumental role in
crafting the Delaware Court of Chancery’s approach to this conflict.
III. CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE: THE CONTINUING VALIDITY
OF MANDATORY ADVANCEMENT BYLAWS
As detailed in Part II, the Delaware Supreme Court’s extension of antiprecommitment doctrine to invalidate a mandatory proxy expense

294. Id.
295. Ursaner, supra note 96, at 507.
296. See Laster, supra note 255.
297. See id.
298. Id.
299. See Ursaner, supra note 96, at 507 (characterizing such actions as claims the board
“otherwise would not be subject to”).
300. Laster, supra note 255. But see supra Part I.B.5.e (discussing this argument in the
context of the Felicetti-Ridder-Neal line of cases).
301. See Travis Laster, Rock Bottom: Here We Come…, THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET
BLOG (Oct. 24, 2008, 6:40 AM), http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/Blog/2008/10/rockbottom-here-we-come.html (under Despite Conviction: Advancement Rights Continue
Through Appeal).
302. Id.
303. Laster, supra note 255.
304. See id.
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reimbursement bylaw in CA, Inc. 305 has also purportedly nullified
mandatory advancement bylaws 306 that the Court of Chancery has
consistently enforced. 307 Part III first suggests that amendments mandating
advancement to either the DGCL or a corporation’s certificate of
incorporation would protect mandatory advancement in the event the CA,
Inc. decision invalidates mandatory advancement bylaws. It continues by
proposing that the standard of review that the Delaware Supreme Court
employed in CA, Inc. reveals a reason that the CA, Inc. decision will not
render mandatory advancement bylaws invalid.
In light of CA, Inc.’s requirement that mandatory bylaws include
fiduciary out provisions, boards that advance directors’ litigation expenses
will do so at their peril, exposing themselves to fresh breach of duty
claims. 308 The risk of shareholder litigation will discourage boards from
granting advances even when their fiduciary duties permit advancement,
effectively gutting the mandatory aspect of mandatory advancement
bylaws. 309
Denying advancement also presents the board with a litigation risk in the
form of claims to enforce mandatory advancement bylaws by directors
seeking advancement. 310 Here, CA, Inc.’s fiduciary out requirement
appears to provide recalcitrant boards an excuse from their obligations: that
advancement in a particular case would breach their fiduciary duties.311
Assuming that the CA, Inc. holding does, in fact, implicate the validity of
mandatory advancement bylaws under Delaware law, the question this Note
seeks to address is how boards should act (1) to protect their advancement
entitlement as currently recognized under Delaware law, and (2) to
minimize the risk of litigation resulting from their decisions in the
advancement sphere. This Note suggests that an amendment to the DGCL
or to a given corporation’s certificate of incorporation would each serve to
restore the mandatory nature of advancement bylaws.
Nevertheless, this Note also intends to refute the assumption that the CA,
Inc. holding, by itself, renders invalid mandatory advancement bylaws
lacking fiduciary outs. Because the CA, Inc. case reached the court by
certification, the court employed a standard of review that took into account
the entirety of Delaware precedent, a circumstance that is not ordinarily
present in advancement actions.312 The CA, Inc. court was bound to
invalidate the proposed mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaw by
precedent dictating that a board’s compliance with such a bylaw would, in
certain circumstances, comprise a breach of its fiduciary duties.313

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

See supra Parts I.A.4–5.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part I.B.5.
See supra notes 297–99 and accompanying text.
See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 300–03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 300–03 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text.
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Of course, advancement actions before the Delaware Court of Chancery
ordinarily present the court with a set of facts upon which to apply the
Delaware law. 314 Nonetheless, even if a particular advancement case
demanded the rigorous standard of review employed in CA, Inc., the court
would still not invalidate the mandatory advancement bylaw at issue.
No Delaware precedent holds that advancement pursuant to a mandatory
advancement bylaw constitutes a breach of the board’s fiduciary duty. 315
Indeed, the Delaware Court of Chancery has upheld directors’ advancement
rights and enforced mandatory advancement bylaws in even the most
egregious cases. 316 Because no set of facts has dictated such a result in the
past, precedent does not compel invalidation if a certified question were to
present this issue in the future. Moreover, given the court’s enforcement of
mandatory advancement bylaws in the most egregious cases, it seems
unlikely that the court will find itself confronted with a case whose facts
demand such a result.
Thus, the requirement to include fiduciary outs in mandatory
advancement bylaws will not gut their mandatory nature. Instead, these
mandatory advancement bylaws will effectively disable the escape hatch of
fiduciary outs.
A. Boards Should Protect Advancement by Amending Certificates
of Incorporation
In the CA, Inc. decision, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that
AFSCME’s proposed mandatory proxy expense reimbursement bylaw
could only be valid under Delaware law if: (1) the proposed bylaw
included a fiduciary out provision; (2) the CA, Inc. certificate of
incorporation was amended to allow such a restriction on the board’s
powers; or (3) the Delaware General Assembly amended the DGCL to
expressly permit such a bylaw. 317
Thus, the first step directors can take to secure their advancement
entitlements is to amend their corporations’ certificates of incorporation to
mandate advancement to directors to the full extent of Delaware law.
CA, Inc. purportedly requires mandatory advancement bylaws to include
fiduciary outs because mandatory advancement bylaws otherwise
impermissibly constrain a board’s ability to exercise its fiduciary duties.
Nevertheless, section 102(b)(1) of the DGCL dictates that restrictions on a
board’s managerial authority are permissible so long as they appear in the
corporation’s certificate of incorporation.318
Therefore, a board may certainly precommit to a mandatory advancement
policy without implicating its fiduciary duties if it amends the corporation’s

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Cf. supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.5.
See supra Part I.B.5.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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certificate of incorporation to that effect. 319 This strategy would ultimately
preserve advancement rights to the full extent permitted under Delaware
law while also protecting directors from the claim that an advance breached
their fiduciary duties.
B. The Delaware General Assembly Should Protect Advancement
by Amending the DGCL
The second step directors can take to secure advancement entitlements is
to encourage the Delaware General Assembly to amend section 145 of the
DGCL to mandate advancement to the full extent of Delaware decisional
law. Section 145 contemplates a liberal advancement regime to serve a
number of salutary public policies. 320 As a result, Delaware courts have
interpreted and enforced mandatory advancement bylaws to craft expansive
advancement rights. 321 Because a board may attempt to deny advancement
after CA, Inc. given the fiduciary out requirement, the Delaware General
Assembly may find it necessary to mandate advancement in the DGCL to
shore up the public policies that advancement supports. In light of section
145(c)’s mandate of indemnification, 322 a mandate of advancement will
likely support these beneficial policies as well.
C. Why CA, Inc. Ultimately Leaves Mandatory Advancement Bylaws Intact
The preceding two proposals presume that directors will use CA, Inc.’s
fiduciary out requirement to avoid their advancement obligations. In other
words, these approaches are advisable given that boards will capably
demonstrate that their fiduciary duties in fact preclude advancement. This
assumption overlooks a crucial difference, however, that distinguishes
bylaws mandating advancement from those mandating proxy expense
reimbursement. This difference ultimately protects directors’ advancement
entitlement from the exercise of fiduciary outs.
Because CA, Inc. reached the Delaware Supreme Court via certification,
the case lacked a factual record upon which to apply Delaware law.323
Under ordinary circumstances, the court would have considered the parties’
evidence and decided whether a particular reimbursement of proxy
expenses precluded the board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties.324 In CA,
Inc., however, the court had to consider whether the proposed bylaw’s
mandate to reimburse proxy expenses would preclude the board’s exercise
of its fiduciary duties in any possible circumstance.325 Ultimately, the court
found that the bylaw would indeed interfere with the board’s fiduciary
duties in one specific scenario—when the proxy contest was motivated by
319. This approach requires that both the board and a majority of shareholders approve
the proposed amendment to the certificate. See supra note 153.
320. See supra notes 167–71 and accompanying text.
321. See supra Part I.B.5.
322. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
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personal or petty concerns.326 Under this precedent, the Delaware Supreme
Court was bound to hold that AFSCME’s proposed bylaw, if adopted,
would cause CA to violate Delaware law, 327 and that a fiduciary out would
be sufficient to cure this flaw. 328
The critical difference between bylaws mandating proxy expense
reimbursement and those mandating advancement is that the Delaware
Court of Chancery has never found that a board’s obligation to advance
pursuant to a mandatory bylaw actually precludes the exercise of the
board’s fiduciary duties. 329 CA, Inc. correctly presumes that a fiduciary out
will impact a proxy expense reimbursement bylaw precisely because the
proper exercise of fiduciary duties will preclude a board from reimbursing
proxy expenses in a proxy contest based on personal or petty concerns.
Nevertheless, the Delaware Court of Chancery has never recognized a
factual context in which a mandatory advancement bylaw would, in fact,
constrain the board’s ability to exercise its fiduciary duties.330
This difference is significant because a board denying advancement will
not be able to argue successfully, as the law currently stands, that its
fiduciary duties preclude advancement. Indeed, even where a director has
pled guilty to an offense that would render him ineligible for
indemnification, the court has enforced his advancement rights.331
In even the most unfavorable case, then, it seems clear that an intractable
board could not successfully claim that its fiduciary duties preclude
advancement. Because boards will not be able to avoid the obligation to
advance, CA, Inc.’s fiduciary out requirement will have no effect on the
validity and enforceability of mandatory advancement bylaws.
CONCLUSION
The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME
Employees Pension Plan invalidated a proposed bylaw mandating proxy
expense reimbursement because compliance with the bylaw in one scenario
would cause the board to breach its fiduciary duties. The CA, Inc. decision
thereby extended Delaware jurisprudence against precommitment
arrangements that prevent directors from fully discharging their duties to
shareholders.
The CA, Inc. court suggested that inclusion of fiduciary out provisions
would render mandatory bylaws valid, but this requirement might also
permit boards to escape their obligation to advance defendant directors’
legal expenses under mandatory advancement bylaws.
Nonetheless, boards will not succeed in exercising fiduciary outs to deny
advancement because the Delaware Court of Chancery recognizes no
situation where advancement would actually breach directors’ fiduciary
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.5.
See supra Part I.B.5.
See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
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duties. While corporations and the Delaware General Assembly may act to
protect directors’ advancement rights, the CA, Inc. decision itself does not
disturb mandatory advancement bylaws.

